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Harry G. Hutchison*
In the flaring parks, in the taverns, in the hushed academies,
your murmur will applaud the wisdom of a thousand quacks.
For theirs is the kingdom.1
Introduction
One candid reporter offers this assessment, “I honestly believe it, and I’m ashamed to say it:
the Labor movement is on life support.”2 He later notes, “Where the hell is Moses when you need
him? I mean parting the Red Sea is nothing compared to the challenges we face as a [labor]
movement.”3 This bracing appraisal corroborates evidence pointing to a steady decline in the
unionized share of the U.S. work force – 7.9% of the private sector in 2004.4 After experiencing
a steady increase in both wages and productivity over several decades, it appears that only 35
percent of non-unionized workers are interested in unionizing their workplace and only 16
percent would definitely vote to unionize.5
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Membership woes6 generate growing fears of looming union irrelevance despite extensive
counterfactual evidence substantiating persistent growth in union political influence7 and
economic wealth.8 Notwithstanding the counterfactuals, academic observers offer similar
pessimism9, implying that many of the hopeful proposals for labor “reform” are nothing more
than attempts to reshuffle the deck chairs on the Titanic.10 Such despondency has led some labor
union proponents to contemplate the abolition of the National Labor Relations Act11 (NLRA).
There appears to be gloom regarding labor’s future, and this gloominess is attached to the
expectant belief that unions exemplify and secure communal progress. Labor’s current
difficulties correspond with despair over the failure of the progressive agenda, and signify that it
is time to start over12, as the economic13 and political14 conditions which have enabled the NLRA
to succeed in the past have come to an end.15

6

Harry G. Hutchison, Reclaiming the Labor Movement Through Union Dues? A Postmodern
Perspective in the Mirror of Public Choice Theory, 33 UNIV. OF MICH. J. OF LAW REFORM, 447,
450 (2000)[hereinafter, Hutchison, Reclaiming the Labor Movement].
7
See William J. Moore et al., The Political Influence of Unions and Corporations on COPE
Votes in the U.S. Senate, 1979-1988, 16 J. LAB. RES. 2003, 218-19 (1995) (the evidence fails to
show a decline in the political influence of unions).
8
From the period 1991 through 1995, for instance, total receipts by several of the major
international unions, which make up the AFL-CIO actually increased while membership
declined. Kenneth R. Weinstein & Thomas M. Wielgus, How Unions Deny Workers Rights, The
Heritage Foundation, at http://www.heritage.org/library/categories/regulation/bg1087.html (July
18, 1996).
9
See e.g., Charles B. Craver, The Labor Movement Needs a Twenty-First Century Committee for
Industrial Organization, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 69, 69 (2005) (“American labor
movement is in a moribund state.”), and Sanford M. Jacoby, Reflections on Labor Law Reform
and the Crisis of American Labor, 69 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 219, 219-227 (skeptically considering
the efficacy of labor reform proposals in dealing with the labor crisis).
10
See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, Rearranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: The Inadequacy of
Modest Proposals to Reform Labor Law, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1616 (1995).
11
See e.g., Ellen Dannin, At 70, Should the National Labor Relations Act Be Retired?: NLRA
Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223, 274 (2005)
(arguing that we should make the NLRA values America’s values as part of the war “between
those who support collective values and well-being for all and those who support unbridled
individualism”).
12
Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized
Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 59.
13
Id. at 61.
14
Clarence B. Carson, Unionism Revisited, 34 THE FREEMAN: IDEAS ON LIBERTY (1984)
(accessed on May 12, 2006 at page 4 in online version) available at
http://www.fee.org/publications/the-freeman/article.asp?aid=1058&print-view=true.
15
Gottesman, supra note ___ at 61.

2

From a global perspective, these dire developments were foreseeable.16 More than 50
years ago, Jacques Ellul saw unions as largely technical entities which predictably trapped
workers in compulsory organizations that diminished both their personalities and independence,
despite the earlier hope by some that unions would act as a revolutionary force that would free
workers from the bureaucratic power wielded by large organizations.17 Ellul insists that labor
unions are best understood as institutions led by hierarchs who have an inadequate understanding
of the unorganized workforce and the necessity of human liberty.18 Ellul’s verdict—coupled with
data on union density rates and other evidence justifying the labor movement’s
melancholy—substantiates Epstein’s forecast that private sector unions will continue to lose
ground because they no longer provide their membership with benefits that exceed their costs.19
With the publication of Free Choice for Workers: a History of the Right to work
Movement, George Leef reexamines labor unions and contests the justification offered in
support of America’s labor laws. Leef’s perspective delegitimizes compulsory unionism on
ethical and empirical grounds. “One dominant feature of this system is the necessary abrogation
of the contract at will,” notes Richard Epstein, “for an employer is not allowed to dismiss any
worker for engaging in union activities or expressing union sympathies.”20 Such arrangements are
customarily attached to progressive principles and ideals, and are “typically justified by an appeal
to ideas of economic duress, employer exploitation, and inequality of bargaining power.”21
Demonstrating that statutory compulsion fails to lead society on a pathway to progress, the book
reveals that the road to serfdom can often be paved by bureaucratic regulation.22 Carefully
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examining history and contemporary events, Leef contributes to the richly textured debate about
the normative role of unions in a putatively free society. Although F.A. Hayek is spot on when
he notes that “[c]ontemporary events differ from history in that we do not know the results they
will produce,23” he is equally correct in understanding that we can discern tendencies.24 Leef’s
book provides a historical appraisal that helps society learn from the past25, and explicates the
capacity of principled ideals, embedded in fearless individuals, to trump historical tendencies
favoring privileged and entrenched autocracies. George Leef’s reassessment offers an essentially
contractarian and liberal model of labor relations that focuses on a vision of individual rights
which have a clearly defined, independent existence predating society.26 From this perspective,
Leef specifies liberty as a desirable good in and of itself, which is then placed in harm’s way by
progressive ideals and constructs. In the essay that follows, I offer neither a meta-narrative on
contractarianism nor a comprehensive refutation of the criticism of the contractarian model.
Nevertheless, I contend that Leef supplies a highly pragmatic and strongly theoretical (if
incomplete) argument against the tendency to see government as the solution to the “labor
problem.”
In Part I, I consider the origin of the Right to Work law movement and Right to Work
laws, as a response to the establishment of the Railway Labor Act, the shrinkage of the common
law, the creation of the National Labor Relations Act, and other labor laws. While human
freedom and negative liberty may constitute a first-order good, it is possible that the extent of
freedom and liberty (including freedom of speech and association) remains a contingent, not
absolute, good. The contingency of the good depends on whether there is some principled basis
for diminishing the good itself.27
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In Part II, I offer analysis. This focus inevitably concentrates on the eternal conflict
between human freedom and government intervention aimed at ameliorating inequality, income
disparity and human suffering. While historically this quarrel has been attached to notions of
justice that originated with Socrates, and has continued until the time of John Stuart Mill and
John Rawls, this debate must also consider the purportedly positive benefits associated with
industrial peace as well.28 It seems clear that George Leef’s perspective supplies a persuasive
case that suggests that the Right to Work movement has contributed to human liberty while
diminishing the allure of government regulatory power.
I. The Origin of the Right to Work Movement and Right to Work Laws.
Free Choice for Workers vindicates the commitment of courageous Americans to certain
freedoms, such as freedom of conscience, freedom of association and freedom to say no to
groups, values and actions that individuals find incompatible with their own beliefs.29 Implicit in
this understanding of liberty is the notion of freedom from coercion, authoritarianism, violence
and intimidation from those who hold contrary views. This understanding can be seen as
controversial when the source of coercion is the government itself. More controversially, Leef
shows that the source of coercion is not direct government power but private, putatively
voluntary associations of workers that have attained legal rights and privileges.30 Labor
organizations can, under federal and various state laws, condition employment on the payment of
union dues, or alternatively agency fees and workers are given the stark choice of paying up or
losing their job.31 Since 1955, however, “there has been one organization dedicated to the
principle that Americans should not be compelled to support unions and accept their supposed
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services against their wills,”32 the National Right to Work Law Committee (NRWLC) and its
progeny.
Free Choice for Workers breathes life into the contention that autocratic labor unions
require a dedicated opponent. Consider Rod Carter. While working for UPS, he declined to
participate in a 1997 strike that Teamsters Local 769 and the national Teamsters union called
against his employer. “Top union officers ordered all drivers to cease working and support the
strike, no matter their personal circumstances.”33 Ignoring threats, he continued to work in order
to support his family, which led to an attack by union militants. They jumped him, punched and
beat him severely and then finally stabbed him in the chest with an ice pick several times.34 How
did the United States become a country in which citizens can be beaten up for working for a
living? In responding to this question, George Leef describes the evolution of America’s labor
cartel. This evolution includes the rejection of the common law, and the extension of various
privileges and immunities to labor organizations as part of a movement aimed at allowing unions
“to be freer of the constraints that bind businessmen and everyone else, thereby allowing unions
more latitude to use their aggressive tactics.”35 Essential vehicles for the formation and
preservation of labor cartels are statutory rules that: (1) grant unions the right of exclusive
representation36 , (2) allow unions to deploy a selective incentive37 — compulsory dues payments
in the form of an agency, union or a closed shop and (3) subordinate individual workers’ interest
to the tyranny of the majority.
Once a union has been certified as the bargaining agent for a group of workers it typically
has the power to bind all workers to a contract. Leef identifies this authority as the grant of
monopoly status to unions, and the elimination of the freedom of workers to make their own
contracts.38 This practice operates contrary to the prudential judgment of Justice Brandeis, a longtime supporter of organized labor, who nevertheless supported restrictions on union power.39
32
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Justice Brandeis stated: “The union attains success when it reaches the ideal condition and the
ideal condition for a union is to be strong and stable, and yet to have in the trade outside of its
ranks an appreciable number of men who are non-unionists . . . Such a nucleus of unorganized
labor will check oppression by the union as the union checks oppression by the employer.”40 The
notion of competition within the labor market sector functions consistently with a principled
conception of liberty, but is incompatible with America’s labor history and labor laws.
A. Transforming the Common Law: American Labor History
Free Choice for Workers examines the creation and implementation of an interventionist and
prescriptively collectivist model in American labor relations. Leef argues that “under the
common law, there was no need for a special set of rules for labor relations because the law of
contract and property rights was sufficient to handle any dispute that arose.”41 Individual
workers were “free to join labor organizations and seek to bargain as a group if they wanted to do
so”42, and employers were permitted to “choose whether or not they would bargain with the
representatives of a labor organization.”43 While “union officials had sought preferential laws
even before the era of the Great Depression,”44 the depression triggered numerous proposals
aimed at delimiting the common law within and outside the labor law arena. Herbert Hoover is
frequently referred to as a clumsy laissez-faire proponent who refused to initiate government
action needed to prop up the crumbling economy from 1929 to 1932.45 Reality is quite different.
President Hoover was an interventionist who set the stage for even greater government
involvement during the Roosevelt administration.46 He approved the Norris-LaGuardia Act that
gave union officials a good deal of what they wanted.47 The centerpiece of the legislation was its
anti-injunction provision.48 Although some academic observers assert that “injunctions were
unfairly suppressing workers in their attempt to improve their conditions . . . the empirical
evidence. . . . [shows] that injunctions were seldom issued except where there had been violence
40
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associated with a strike. “49 Consistent with that observation, after the passage of the act, “the
number of strikes, repeatedly accompanied by violence, doubled from 1932 to 1933 and
continued to rise in following years.”50
Free Choice for Workers offers additional evidence that government intervention backfires
in other ways as well. First Franklin Roosevelt was elected with energetic backing from union
leaders.51 Second, Roosevelt’s “Brain Trust” consisted of men who were admirers of European
collectivism, in which strong unions were regarded as socially beneficial.52 Members of the
“Brain Trust” were captivated by the paradoxical idea that high prices caused prosperity, and
hence believed that high wages would help the economy by giving workers more purchasing
power.53 While Richard Vedder and Lowell Gallaway demonstrate the absurdity of this view,54 it
is unmistakably clear that cartelization—both of business and labor—became an accepted article
of faith during the Roosevelt period.55 As Leef puts it, “The year 1934 was marked by numerous
violent strikes in which the heads of unions sought to compel management to recognize and deal
with them.”56 This effort solidified and accelerated measures aimed at bringing cartelization to
the labor market. Disruption in an already weak economy provided an attractive “industrial
peace” rationale for the passage of new labor laws that culminated in the enactment of the
Wagner Act of 1935.57 Explicitly attached to these laws were the contestable claims that the
49

Id. at 8.
Id. (emphasis added).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Richard K. VEDDER & LOWELL E. GALLAWAY, OUT OF WORK: UNEMPLOYMENT AND
GOVERNMENT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA, 142 (1993) (“New Deal Wage costenhancing policies more than doubled the amount of abnormally large unemployment [during the
middle of the depression era]”). See also id at 129-149; see also id at 138-139 (“The Wagner Act
can be viewed as a continuation of the underconsumptionist, high wage policy initiated by
Hoover and developed further by Roosevelt.”). This approach led to prolonged unemployment
related to unionization, social security and other New Deal policies which taken together suggest
that wage-cost-enhancing policies more than doubled the amount of abnormally large
unemployment during 1937. See id at 141-142.
55
LEEF, supra note____ at 8-10. Among the New Deal efforts were the enactment of the
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) grounded in the mistaken belief that America’s
economic troubles were rooted in the free market system itself. Thus NIRA moved the United
States toward a planned economy replete with “codes of fair competition.” The law in effect
promoted business cartels. Cartelization was then extended to labor. See id. at 9.
56
Id. at 10.
57
Id.. at 10-12.
50

8

“inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of
association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or
other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce,
and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions . . .”58 Proponents of the NLRA also
claimed that industrial peace would be advanced through compulsory union activity. Leef
exposes the transformation of “industrial peace” reasoning into constitutional cover in the form
of congressional power to regulate interstate commerce within the meaning of Article I, Section 8
of the United States Constitution.59
The NLRA subordinated workers’ freedom to choose their own employment arrangements
to the insistent demand of union hierarchs for “union security.”60 The Wagner Act, while
proclaiming the employees right to self-organization, illogically “gave absolutely no legal
protection to workers to refrain from participating in labor unions or collective bargaining.”61
The Wagner Act also granted unions exclusive representation62, thus providing them with
monopoly status and shredding “another basic American liberty—the freedom to make your own
contracts.”63 Although, “[m]onopolies rarely last very long unless government intervenes to
prevent competition with them,”64 the Wagner Act authorized labor organizations to treat
workers as a captive market to be exploited65 to benefit the preferences and self-interest of union
hierarchs and outsiders with whom the union leadership has fashioned an ideological bond.66 In
sum, the NLRA contained a number of provisions – union security provisions, the right to
exclusive representation, the absence of effective union democracy and the vindication of
58
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majoritarianism – that vitiate workers’ freedom of association and free speech rights.67
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court, far from acting as a guardian of freedom of
speech, instead permitted the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to enact rules that “stifle
real speech by employers.”68 Additionally, the NLRB restricted the property rights of employers
through questionable statutory interpretations.69 Leef adverts to a number of Wagner Act
deficiencies that imperil workers’ freedom to choose —including the fact that once a union has
been certified as the workers’ bargaining agent, it tends to act as such indefinitely, without
having to face periodic reelection campaigns.70 Although decertification is possible,71 “[m]ost
American workers who have union representation have never had the opportunity to vote on it
themselves, since the union was certified before they were hired.”72 Taken together, these
debatable rules expurgate common law principles while at the same time prove that workers’
autonomy and liberty interests were not the central concern for neither those who drafted the
legislation, nor the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
B. Right to Work Laws and the Origins of the Right to Work Movement
In light of the benefits they received through the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and
the Wagner Act, unions flourished in the period between 1935 and 194773, and membership
soared from three to fifteen million.74 In some heavily industrialized sectors, union membership
comprised eighty percent of the workforce.75 This vision of expansive labor union power reached
67

See e.g., Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note ___ at 1395. Stewart J. Schwab,
Union Raids, Union Democracy, and the Market For Union Control, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 367,
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its pinnacle when John L. Lewis led coal miners in two prolonged and devastating strikes during
World War II.76 In “response to the postwar deregulation of wages and prices in August 1945,
‘major unions immediately demanded huge raises, thirty percent and more . . . [and] union
leaders . . . threatened to shut the country down.”77 During and after World War II, the labor
movement thus acted consistently with the objective of augmenting its power and expanding “its
forced-dues empire.”78 Illustrating the incoherence of the industrial peace justification for the
NLRA, “[d]uring the war, union [leaders] ordered more than 13,000 strikes--many of them
having nothing to do with wages and working conditions, but simply to expand their control over
the labor market.”79
On the other hand, an embryonic movement led by opponents of “compulsory unionism
succeeded in getting referenda placed on the 1944 general election ballots in Florida and
Arkansas, asking voters to approve laws that would make contracts, which forced workers to
choose between paying union dues and losing their jobs, illegal.”80 Both measures were
approved.81 A few years later, three more states added Right to Work protection for workers, and
six additional states followed suit in 1947.82 The labor movement was horrified and filed suit
culminating in two decisions by the United States Supreme Court to uphold state Right to Work
law protection.83 Justice Hugo Black in a concurring opinion in one case stated,
There cannot be wrung from a constitutional right of workers to assemble to
discuss improvement of their own working standards, a further constitutional right
to drive from remunerative employment all persons who will not or cannot
participate in union assemblies.84
With successful state referenda ratified by the United States Supreme Court, a vibrant grassroots
movement aimed at blocking compulsory unionism in America began. This movement was
reinforced by the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 via a Congressional override of
76
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President Truman’s veto.85 George Leef observes that the passage Taft-Hartley Amendments had
little immediate effect on the growth of unionization.86 Instead, unions grew to comprise 36
percent of private sector workers by 1953.87 Therefore, claims that the Taft-Hartley Act withdrew
nearly all union advantages and reduced union density rates, are not sustained by the empirical
record. While the Taft-Hartley Act attempted a more balanced approach to labor relations than
the Wagner Act by adding a list of union unfair labor practices such as coercion, discrimination
and the use of secondary boycotts, the statute did not withdraw federal support for most of the
characteristics of compulsory unionism.88
Nonetheless, crucial for the right to work law movement was the addition of the following
language:
Nothing contained in the amendment made by subsection (a) shall be construed to
as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in
a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in
which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.89
Leef argues, however, that the rights of workers to refrain from unionism could have been
effectuated more effectively by simply abolishing the original (Wagner Act) statute.90 Although
free rider claim have been used to maintain union coercion, Leef eviscerates such arguments by
demonstrating that worker interests are not uniform.91 Without consent, or interest uniformity
among workers, the free rider pretext collapses.92 Because only the individual can assess the
subjective benefits of union membership93, represented workers who prefer to remain
independent of a union are likely to become forced riders via union security agreements. Further,
85
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domestic automobile industry.
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contrary to contentions by labor union advocates, Leef shows that unions have continued to exist
in Right to Work law states despite the fact that workers can legally withdraw their support.
Additionally, Leef convincingly argues that unions might act more responsibly if they had to
compete for resources provided by working people.94
Persistent union autocracy and violence continued to fuel the Right to Work movement. In
1953, the Teamsters Union organized taxicab companies across the nation and called a strike in
Wichita, Kansas. The companies resisted and workers continued to go to work. The Teamsters
responded by targeting such workers with stink bombs, bottles, paint, and gasoline bombs. The
union continued to issue threats and the dispatch office of one company was dynamited. Violence
continued to escalate. On the night of December 12, 1953, cab driver Deering Crowe was beaten
with repeated blows to the face. This assault burst a malignant tumor. The operation required to
repair Crowe’s tumor was delayed and he died leaving a widow and two children. This act of
violence coincided with an ongoing debate in Kansas over a Right to Work bill that had been
introduced in the legislature. Before his death, Crowe had become a compelling spokesperson for
the law, and his story provoked Reed Larson95 to become the driving force in the American
Right to Work Law movement.96
In 1955 the National Right to Work Committee proclaimed both its existence and its sole
objective – the elimination of compulsory unionism.97 The committee announced the following
goals: educate the public about the threats posed by compulsory unionism; encourage and
support both employers and employees who resist the adoption of union shops; assist workers
who were fighting in the courts to protect their jobs from union initiated discharges; and provide
information and material to the various state groups that were engaged in the fight against
compulsory unionism.98 The Right to Work movement had to overcome the failure of politicians
and large corporations to take a principled stand in favor of the liberty of workers. This failure
contributed to funding problems, which were solved through direct mail efforts. Direct mail
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efforts produced hundreds of small individual contributions from workers and small businesses.99
The Right to Work Movement, however, lost five of six referenda campaigns during 1958.100
Because of these difficulties, some considered the Right to Work effort dead, yet both the
movement and its organization experienced a revival during the 1960s.101
C. Defending Government Employees From Forced Unionism.
Because it seemed impossible to bargain collectively with government in the 1950s, the
labor movement focused much of its energy on unionizing the private sector workplace.102 This
attitude changed in the 1960s.103 Labor hierarchs realized that they had overlooked “a gold mine
of workers who might become union dues payers.”104 Union leaders decided not “to rely on
persuasion to get more workers to join voluntarily.”105 Leef illustrates the NRWLC’s struggle to
counter these efforts. The reluctance of politicians to place the liberty of interests of individual
workers ahead of short-term political expediency contributed to the thorniness of this conflict.
For example, in an effort to improve efficiency and take small steps toward privatizing the U.S.
Postal service during the Nixon administration, Postmaster General Winton Blount106 agreed to
compulsory unionism for postal workers.107 This agreement, if ratified, would have provided a
foothold for unions to “install compulsory unionism throughout the federal government.”108
With 750,000 workers, the Post office “was the largest civilian employer in the United
States.”109 Approximately “20 percent [of the workforce] had chosen not to join a union, a right
that was protected under Executive Order 10988 issued by President Kennedy in 1962.”110 This
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order “had been reiterated by President Nixon’s Executive Order 11491. . . . in 1969.”111
Nonetheless, Blount concealed his capitulation to AFL-CIO demands.112 After discovering this
surrender, the NRWLC launched an effective counterattack within the United States Chamber of
Commerce, in similar business groups, and among significant contributors to Republican
candidates.113 While the “postal service remains inefficient and mailing costs escalate faster than
the rate of inflation, Congress with the assistance of the NRWLC, has continued to ban
compulsory unionism within the Postal Service, and to advance the principle of individual
liberty.”114 Although the NRWLC has not always triumphed115, its vigilant efforts against
attempts to expand compulsory unionism within the federal government sector have been largely
successful.116
D. Rent Seeking in the Construction Industry and the Battle for “Reform.”
Union activities in the construction industry included efforts to maximize both the number
of job classifications and the number of jobs. Together these efforts would maximize profits for
union treasuries while providing economic rent for the labor movement.117 In cooperation with
these objectives, unions turned their attention to common situs picketing118, and other efforts119
aimed at stifling competition from nonunion shop operators. Most of these efforts, as John
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Gray120 might describe, involved politics in pursuit of special interests.121 In the past, labor
officials used common situs picketing until “it was declared to be an unfair labor practice by the
Supreme Court’s ruling in NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council in 1951.”122
Craving the capacity to inflict economic damage on parties with whom the union did not have a
dispute (site owners), unions sought a legislative solution. However, the National Right to Work
Law Committee’s fierce opposition led to the defeat of common situs picketing bills in 1975 and
1977.123
Among other “reform” efforts, labor unions supported campaign finance initiatives.
Clearly, “government financing of elections might tilt the playing field” because “union officials
would still be free to support their favored candidates with hundreds of millions of dollars worth
of ‘in kind’ services such as phone banks and get-out-the-vote drives.”124 The NRWLC took
action to prevent this initiative by working to intercept this legislation. Additional “reform”
efforts included the enactment of laws, making it easier for unions to prevail in certification
efforts before the National Labor Relations Board.125 Skillfully supporting legislative filibusters,
the NRWLC facilitated the defeat of these “reforms.”
E. Legal Defense Efforts.
While the accomplishments of the NRWLC in the legislative arena have been noteworthy,
its work in the litigation arena has been equally impressive. The latter arena remains crucial
because autocratic union officials, often snub the law.126 “Over the years, thousands of workers
have suffered violations of their rights, including physical violence and even death, because they
120
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. . . put their own desires and welfare above the demands of union autocrats.”127 Union hierarchs
discover the irresistible temptation to engage in subordination while workers fall victim to
intimidation. Archibald Cox describes this quandary clearly:
Most men are reluctant to incur the financial cost in order to vindicate intangible
rights. Individual workers who sue union officers run enormous risks, for there are
many ways, legal as well as illegal, by which entrenched officials can ‘take care
of’ recalcitrant members.128
Union bullying requires an opponent with ample resources and sufficient motivation to lessen the
odds. The National Right to Work Law Committee catalyzed the formation of a new entity – the
National Right To Work Legal Defense Foundation (LDF).129 They are separate organizations,
each with its own staff and sources of funding130, but neither takes a partisan political position.131
The LDF takes cases involving misuse of compulsory union dues for political and ideological
purposes as well as cases involving violations of workers’ constitutional rights of free speech,132
assembly and other civil rights; violations of the merit principle in public employment and
academic freedom in public education; injustices in the compulsory union hiring hall referral
system; violations of existing protections against compulsory unionism133, and cases involving
union violence.134
Among the LDF”s most famous Supreme Court cases are Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education135 and Beck v. Communication Workers of America.136 In Beck, the District Court
ultimately found that “the collection and disbursement of agency fees for purposes other than
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collective bargaining violated the First Amendment rights of workers.”137 Moreover, a special
master appointed by the court found that the union spent nearly 80 percent of its income on
political activities and other matters having nothing to do with collective bargaining.138 This
finding is vital because such evidence, along with similar proof139, extirpates persistent union free
rider arguments in favor of compulsory unionism and mandatory dues payments.140
The Supreme Court decision in Beck, upheld the district court’s decision, but rested largely
on the narrower claim that the union breached its duty of fair representation.141 The Beck decision
provides a starting point for dissenting workers to take such claims either to court or the NLRB.
In light of the imbalance in economic resources favoring unions, the vindication of employee
rights is rare. This is particularly true at the administrative agency level, since the NLRB appears
driven by a political calculus that favors compulsory unionism. Accordingly, the Board has been
reluctant to support workers’ duty of fair representation rights — even when the United States
Supreme Court has previously vindicated them.142 Indeed, the NLRB delayed for eight years
before issuing it first post-Beck decision, California Saw.143
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Despite the challenges it faces, the Right to Work movement has been very effective.
Verification comes in the form of counterattacks by America’s labor hierarchy, with similar
efforts by the American government’s bureaucracy. The counterattack has taken the following
forms: (A) a lawsuit filed by thirteen union and the AFL-CIO asserting “Right to Work
organizations were financing workers’ lawsuits against unions with funds provided by ‘interested
employer,’ conduct allegedly . . . prohibited by the Landrum-Griffin Act”144; (B) a labor union
suit that sought to compel the disclosure of Right To Work contributors despite a Supreme Court
decision preventing such disclosures in NAACP v. Alabama145; ( C) an Internal Revenue Service
challenge the LDF’s charitable status which threatened the tax deductibility of contributions146;
(D) an aggressive effort led by the Chairman of the Federal Election Commission (FEC) who
formerly served as the AFL-CIO’s associate general counsel, who, “used the powers of office”147
to impede the Right to Work movement.
Among the NRWLC’s cherished objectives is to pass statutes that extend the Right to Work
principle to more states while concurrently defending statutes that are already in place. The AFLCIO recognizes the benefits of combat through exhaustion—its allies have introduced bills to
repeal Right to Work laws in eight to ten states per year.148 On the litigation side, the LDF is
embroiled in important efforts to prevent “top-down organizing.”149 Since union leaders
recognize that they are likely to lose fifty-percent of union certification votes and even if they
prevail they may fail to successfully negotiate a collective bargaining agreement, labor leaders
“have taken to pressuring management into forcing unionism on their employees whether they
want it or not.”150 In essence, labor and management join together and agree they will support
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unionization.151 LDF lawsuits attack the legality of this trend in union organizing.152 On the
legislative front the Right to Work Committee has remained vigilant against recent proposals to
approve “unionization without a secret ballot vote of the workers”153 while continuing to support
efforts aimed at protecting “workers against union coercion and abuse.”154 Such efforts vindicate
the observation that compulsory unionism is “antithetical to the American tradition of liberty and
individual choice.”155 Eighty percent “ of the public believes that workers should not be
compelled to belong to a union in order to hold a job.”156 Nevertheless, the Right to Work
movement will face persistent difficulty in translating the preferences of most Americans into a
reality enjoyed by all workers. An examination of the justification, the origin of the opposition to
the workers’ liberty interests and the correlative desire to impose labor organizations on workers
frames the discussion in the next section.
II. Analysis.
What has always made the state a hell on earth has been
precisely that man has tried to make it his heaven.157
James Madison once argued: “if industry and labor are left to take their own course, they
will generally be directed to those objects which are the most productive, and this in a more
certain and direct manner than the wisdom of the most enlightened Legislature could point out . .
. [A]ll are benefited by exchange, and the less this exchange is cramped by Government, the
greater are the proportions of benefit to each.”158 The Madisonian perspective was premised on
the idea that limited constitutional government constitutes a bulwark for individual liberty.
Conversely, alternative conceptions of government, reify unlimited democracy and allow
151
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government to take sides and augment the sharpness, if not the death rate, of the war of all
against all. Although, Madison and the framers favored a modest conception of government, this
view has lost of its luster in an era that is drawn to progressive ideals and postmodern identities.
On an individual and collective basis, modesty and self-restraint has limited appeal for
contemporary individuals who are captivated by the expansive claims of the likes of Rorty159,
Sweeney160 or Shklar.161 Further, an expansive and progressive self-conception compels or, at the
very least, implies an expansive government. Accordingly, government power, becomes essential
to attain and secure various identities that humans can imagine for themselves and others.
Government power is positioned as a bureaucratic preference fulfillment apparatus in which
resources are redistributed so as to contribute to collective satisfaction while incommensurability
qualms are overlooked. Whether they are the actual, or inadvertent intellectual heirs of Mill162 or
Bentham, the central concern of progressives is to achieve the “greatest good for the greatest
number of individuals.”163 Mill certainly expressed support for the claim that human beings
should be free to form opinions, and to express their opinions without reserve as part of what
159
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might be called liberty.164 It is unclear whether Mill successfully resolved the tension between
liberty and utility. Nonetheless, it seems obvious that utilitarianism and the persistent “appeal to
utility must be ‘grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being.’”165
Whatever the risk to human freedom associated with NLRA and other New Deal legislation, such
laws arrived at a time when Americans were increasingly receptive to progressive ideas.
A. A Progressive Conception of Labor Law and Labor Unions.
While the various labor statutes enacted during the 1930s likely operate as paragons of
majoritarianism, consider briefly the progressive case for government regulation. Progressives of
various stripes, as early as the 1930s, both within and outside the labor market context, produced
a large number of claims that are either premised on the market failure presumption166, or
alternatively attached to labor solidarity aspirations.167 Senator Wagner, the lead drafter of the
NLRA, relied on similar claims. He invoked market failure and labor solidarity claims (along
with an industrial peace rationale) to argue that statutorily protected unionism provides freedom
and dignity, through cooperation with others for workers caught in the labyrinth of modern
industrialism and dwarfed by the size of the corporate enterprise.168 Missing in the “equality of
bargaining” component of this claim is an understanding central to union membership disputes:
the fact that cooperation in the form of dues payments or membership, are premised on statutory
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mandates that are coercive on their face169 Conversely, the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments
recognized the NLRA’s coercive effects, and commenced the process of protecting the freedom
of association rights of workers by providing workers with explicit permission to refrain from
engaging in concerted activity.170 These changes were limited because workers were still bound
by majority rule and exclusive representation rules that enhance the power of labor cartels.
George Leef clarifies: the NLRA continues to restrict individual human freedom and liberty in a
number of ways. Labor law mandates human association in the form of a compelled collectivity
(labor unions) that retains priority in its inevitable conflict with classically liberal understandings
of human identity and human authenticity which are connected directly to the constitutional
values of freedom of speech and association.171
By contrast, labor movement advocates conceive of labor freedom as a collective
construct, grounded in the notion of obligatory fraternity, as opposed to an individualized entity –
negative liberty – that is a defensible good for its own sake. Compulsory association as a
desirable objective has benefited from its connection with ideas of justice. Justice happens to be a
compelling trump card, because some observers equate capitalism and its emphasis on the
individual with barbarism. As thus understood, socialism becomes the catalyst for freedom.172
Conversely, impartial observers with questionable manners conclude that human barbarity tends
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to perform rather splendidly under socialism.173 Consider Hayek’s intuitive understanding of
history: “the rise of fascism and nazism was not a reaction against the socialist trends of the
preceding period but a necessary outcome of those tendencies.”174 Unimpressed with the logic of
Hayek’s claim, progressive commentators return to the language of justice. Insufficiently
convinced by simple welfare claims embedded in the statutory language of the NLRA, for
example, they are often drawn to the expansive notion that workers must receive certain
entitlements. These rights, they argue, include a so-called fair wage in an egalitarian sense that
comports with the notion of equal dignity.175 Indeed, for some, it may be possible to conclude
that society’s failure to guarantee fair wages, or alternatively to ensure the conditions under
which fair wages flourish constitutes governmental complicity in human cruelty.176 Although few
of these goals are attached explicitly to the NLRA, such provocative contentions ensure that
labor unions remain an indispensable catalyst for progressive societal transformation.177
Consistently with that aspiration, and despite the presence of ongoing ameliorative approaches
(pro-union statutes and the welfare state itself), some observers contend that workers have been
left at the mercy of global employers. Such workers have been deprived of basic and necessary
substantive equality.178 On one account, the work ethic becomes part of the battle for control and
subordination in which working people are required to accept a working life that neither is noble
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nor responds adequately to their own standards of moral decency.179 Globalization allows the old
welfare state (as a societal good) to be demolished as employers “shift the cost of the
‘recommodification of labour’ to the Treasury.”180 Sympathetic American observers have argued
that the union movement ought to be reenergized as a “robust engine of collective insurgency
against globalization, hierarchy, unwarranted management power, class-based injustice, and
increasing disparities income.”181
This view appears to resist the notion of “negative” liberty as well as its struggle against
intrusive government and majoritarianism.182 The progressive outlook amounts to a tangible
thirst for meaning in life despite an inability to articulate convincingly what that might entail.
This dream of liberation is seen (by some) as part of a movement that fashions progressive
human advancement in the form of egalitarianism and solidarity.183 This vision operates in
harmony with the AFL-CIO’s objectives that include making the most “of the solidarity and
energy of the 2004 presidential election campaign . . . by helping workers form unions and
building the most dynamic labor political program in [its] history.”184 In order to achieve these
goods, contemporary labor union organizations must command the mobilization of all workers in
the battle to transform society, and the market, as part of its elusive search for class-based
justice.185 Progressives admit reluctantly that the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 reframed the NLRA to
allow employees some degree of “choice” with respect to unionization and collective
bargaining.186 The Taft-Hartley Act manifested Congress’ intent to de-emphasize self-
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organization and group action.187 Critics respond to such admissions by contending that the act
constitutes a slave-labor act.188 Before 1947 “it was possible to imagine a continuing expansion
and vitalization of the New Deal impulse. After that date, however, labor and the left were forced
into an increasingly defensive posture.”189 These complaints have two emphases: (1) the sharp
drop in contemporary labor union penetration rates—particularly within the private employment
sector—contributed to a loss of labor’s bargaining power190 and (2) a correlative drop in labor’s
political and social influence.191
These developments diminish the likelihood that labor can reshape America as a utopian
enterprise borne of collectivist ideals. These ideals in their propositional form posit that a
desirable form of “civil association” will only be attained when individuals act collectively (and
coercively) in pursuit of their common ends.192 This conception of coercive human association
187
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contra a principled conception of liberalism grounded in individual autonomy, complements the
belief that politics and government power form the proper vehicle to attain the transformation of
society. From a Bickelian perspective, this approach to labor or any other law is grounded in the
notion that the values society adheres to evolve over time.193 While limits are set by culture as
well as time- and place-bound conditions, the task of government informed by the present state
of values is to make a peaceable, good, and improving society.194 Expansively defined, human
progress is the goal. Law—and specifically labor law (as conceived by union hierarchs and labor
movement proponents195) – is seen as the principal vehicle through which this society can assert
its values.196
It is possible that reality is quite different. Human progress and fraternal associations are
possible, but at what costs? Stalin’s efforts to attain a proletarian dictatorship have proved that
fraternity, as well as the average wage rates, can indeed rise when, and if, some workers are
simply liquidated. In a purely materialistic universe, both America and the World may seem to be
of trivial significance across a time and space continuum that provides no source of meaning. If
life has meaning, and if we live in a universe in which meaning is possible, Stalin and Hilter’s
naturalism will be (I believe) unappealing. Still, the dream of progress—the radical
transformation of society and humankind—has found support in various quarters. “Since
Condorcet, the philosophy of Progress has promised to eliminate war, disease, and need, and
various ideologies have announced a radiant future.”197 It is possible that some notion of
compulsory progress operates as a contemporary belief legitimating government protection and
statutory encouragement of labor unions.

193

BICKEL, supra note ____ 4.
Id.
195
See infra Part III, B, discussing Ellen Dannin’s conception of the values that are embedded or
should be embedded in America’s understanding of the NLRA.
196
See BICKEL, supra note ____ at 5.
197
CHANTAL DELSOL, ICARUS FALLEN: THE SEARCH FOR MEANING IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD,
xxiii (2003) (explaining but not necessarily agreeing with this view). See also, EDWARD O.
WILSON, CONSILIENCE, 8 (1998) ( . . . .”I believe that the Enlightenment thinkers of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries got it mostly right the first time. The assumptions they made
of a lawful material world, the intrinsic unity of knowledge, and the potential of indefinite human
progress are the one we still take most readily into our hearts, suffer without and find maximally
rewarding through intellectual advance.”).
194

27

B. Examining the Evidence
Leef’s book presents a persuasive case that the Right to Work Movement is congruent
with American ideals. Both the movement and its opponents require context and an examination
of the evidence that either sustains or refutes the progressive case for human compulsion. The
Right to Work movement and its progressive adversaries are fluent in the language of human
freedom and equality. Differences arise because the Right to Work movement, following Hayek,
seeks equality in negative liberty, while proponents of obligatory progress seek equality in
restraint and servitude while claiming they offer “new freedom.”198 To repeat a paradox, despite
the language of freedom, the labor statutes, as they are interpreted and administered,
communicate compulsion. The various statutes and administrative rulings which regulate labor,
make manifest, workers who are not union members, as well as workers who are members are
obliged to pay either union dues or agency fees as a condition of employment, if the unionmanagement contract requires such payments.199 Contemporary labor law resonates with
majoritarianism which cannot be differentiated fully from authoritarianism. If this understanding
of the inherent tendency of labor law is correct, something inevitably must give. Hayek forecasts,
and Leef verifies, that individual human freedom is the casualty. Leading proponents of labor law
and the labor movement concede as much while frequently misstating the case. Consider the
following understanding of the America’s contemporary labor conflict:
The war is between those who support collective values and well-being for all and
those who support unbridled individualism; between those who value workplace
and social democracy and those who promote workplace and governmental
totalitarianism.200

First, charity commends the following concessions: Professor Dannin, following Bickel, correctly
acknowledges that (A) that failure to recognize any “values at all is to deny a difference between
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ourselves and other particles that tumble in space”201, and (B) that law is the principal institution
through which well-socialized Americans can assert their values.202 Secondly, while Dannin
adverts correctly to the existence of the fundamental conflict between those who support
collectivist values and those who support individual ones, her comments misstate Madison’s
conception of human freedom and liberty grounded in consensual exchange. Although recent
history verifies that government power is placed regularly at the disposal of union hierarchs and
majoritarian hegemony, Dannin’s commentary misplaces governmental totalitarianism by
situating it incorrectly on the side of the individual as opposed to the collective interest. In
reality, her perspective implies that workers’ freedom and liberty must be subjugated to the
collective (majoritarian) interest that reflects a collective conception of the good. In doing so,
Dannin relies on her understanding of the values embedded in a quintessentially majoritarian
instrument – the NLRA, itself. While it is doubtful that the law contains Professor Dannin’s
preferences, the substance of her approach appears, ironically enough, to echo Robert Bork’s
contestable position, which “suggested that “individual rights should be banished from our
political discourse . . . Political majorities have . . . the right to define and ‘suppress’ moral harms
even if doing so thwarts what some people take to be individual rights or liberty.”203 Moreover, it
is possible that lumping governmental totalitarianism in with the side that actually favors worker
freedom operates consistently with Marxism’s deployment of the term “bourgeois culture” as a
way of lumping together anything and everything intellectuals despise.204 Rorty explains:
Such linkages help us intellectuals to associate ourselves with the ideals of
democracy and human solidarity. These linkages let us have the best of both
worlds: we have been able to combine the traditional disdain of the wise for the
many with the belief that the present, degenerate bourgeois many will be replaced
by a new sort of many – the emancipated working class.205
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Assuming the descriptive appeal of Rorty’s analysis, as I have argued elsewhere, workers,
exemplify a prephilosophic – even antediluvian – blank slate that requires direction in order to
acquire sufficient moral intuition.206 In contrast, union hierarchs and their intellectual associates,
see themselves as members of the philosophic vanguard and they function as forerunners of a
preordained future destination that workers’ innate (but still inchoate) intellect guides them to.207
Critically, this in loco parentis perspective deploys the language of “democracy” arguing that the
core of American labor law has been essentially sealed off from both democratic revision and
contemporary renewal and from local experimentation and innovation.208 If this perspective is
valid, the aspirational premises of the New Deal labor regime209 are at risk.
A “benevolent guardian that bargains against management in the workers’ best interest”
might be found to lead a union.210 If this is true, and assuming that all workers’ “best interests,”
are uniformly identical, then free riding may resurface as a possibility211, that justifies
compulsory payments to unions. Many commentators remain skeptical that such a guardian can
be found.212 Doubts are “elevated both by virtue of the existence of dues objectors, and a
comprehensive understanding of the human diversity embedded within the present-day
workforce.”213
If one accepts that progressives have failed substantially to sustain their idealistic case
for compulsion to this point, if progressive proponents see vibrant unionism as a critical
component of government planning that is necessary to ideally redistribute resources214, and if
206
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regulation of labor markets is viewed as a public good, as some aver215, what empirical evidence
now remains to justify compulsory unionism? Because concrete moral judgments often turn on
contingent circumstances as well as on general moral norms216, we must inspect the costs and
benefits associated with the usual suspects, including: (A) industrial peace; (B) notions of justice;
and ( C) the necessity of fraternal association. Because the evidence shows that Americans have
been content to go bowling alone217, it is possible that this isolation may give rise to a yearning
for community. If so, fraternal association likely resonates with some observers.
Nonetheless, consider the empirical case that supports the industrial peace rationale. If
labor peace constitutes a public good, the presumed market correcting benefits of this good might
outweigh the absence of voluntariness in the current labor law regime. Recall that “[t]raditional
collective bargaining under common law prior to the 1930s, in both the public and private
sectors, was voluntary.”218 Voluntary by definition implies a form of individuated consent as a
necessary predicate. Since Herbert Hoover, “collective bargaining under statutes and court
decisions has been compulsory.”219 Free collective bargaining requires “negotiations between
willing parties on both sides: employees freely choose unions to bargain for them; and employers
freely choose to bargain with those unions rather than individual employees.”220 Putting aside
collective action problems that tend to plague large organizations, the current labor paradigm
which delegates power to private groups cannot result in free collective bargaining, given the
absence of worker unanimity and employer choice. Admitting as much, the United States
Supreme Court in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States “unanimously declared the
NIRA [National Industrial Recovery Act] an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to
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private parties.”221 Hence Schechter and Carter v. Carter Coal Co., are among the most important
cases of the 1930s demolishing one of the main pillars of the Roosevelt New Deal effort to
cartelize private industry.222 Still, since the Supreme Court’s holding in these cases, the Court has
enforced labor union compulsion.223 Indeed, it is argued that in the mid-1940s the Supreme Court
appeared to “reinterpret the NLRA and RLA so as to preclude individual employment contracts
in most circumstances,”224 while justifying exclusive representation on labor-peace grounds
against constitutional claims to the contrary.225
Despite little empirical evidence supporting the Court’s interpretation, the question
becomes, how does one confront the Supreme Court’s empirical claims if we live in a world
where we cannot agree on what counts as empirical, or even what constitutes an empirical claim?
It is doubtful that the Supreme Court would consider itself necessarily bound by its own
empirical assertions. On my reading of evidence, however, the Supreme Court’s industrial peace
claim finds its support in consequentialist assertions made by drafters and advocates of the
NLRA, regardless of the absence of empirical evidence that supports these various contentions.
Unvaryingly with an earlier observation226, industrial peace actually declined after passage of the
1930s labor legislation227, thus deflating the industrial peace rationale for compulsory unionism.
If the available evidence refutes the industrial peace rationale, it might be possible to
justify compulsory union on grounds of justice. The empirical evidence is not promising. Recall,
Katz and Summers’ demonstration that most economic rents generated in the United States
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economy accrue to labor.228 Second, labor unions evidently do well at the expense of
minorities229, contribute to the rise of the “underclass,”230 and generally “redistribute income to
their well-paid white members at the expense of groups with lower incomes.”231 All
redistributive efforts are challengeable on ethical grounds232, and of course, the empirical record
suggests that unions redistribute income regressively, therefore raising another layer of
objections. We should not conclude that redistributive efforts associated with compulsory
unionism can be only challenged on empirical grounds because Nozick shows that any “attempt
to impose an approved pattern on the social distribution of goods requires continuous
interference with individual liberty, since gifts and free exchange will constantly subvert the
pattern.”233
There is still another ground that might sustain compulsory unionism. This remaining
ground may or may not be fully refutable on empirical grounds because compulsory unionism,
often, constitutes a normative demand that government alter the terms of civil association.234 This
perspective is attracted to government regulation because it sees “political society as a form of
association that has value only insofar as it serves to unite men in a community in which the
bonds of social solidarity are strong.”235 The language of human freedom is invoked to argue that
solidarity “will be attained only when civil association [commands] that individuals act
collectively in pursuit of their [hierarchically mandated] common ends.”236 This approach
extends the bounds of mandatory collectivity to unions as statutory instruments of the polity in
228
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the quest for presumptively common objectives.237 Meanwhile, classical liberalism shows that a
defensible form of association consists of consenting “individuals bound by rules of just conduct
which by specifying the terms of cooperation, regulate their behaviour and ensure peace.”238
Ideally “civil association has no purpose other than to preserve order so that the individual might
pursue his own (private) ends together with others or alone.”239 If we accept these philosophic
claims, then the case for compulsion finds its theoretical refutation.
Still, if social solidarity is to function as a public good, there is more to be said. Against
this background, a keen observer asserts that many progressives, liberals and unionists might
“say that our problems stem from lack of political power. But our lack of power has its roots in
something even more important and that is our inability to capture the hearts and minds of the
people.”240 Capturing hearts and minds can operate in one of two ways – either as a defensible
association grounded in voluntary consent, or premised on coercion that employs government
power to attain this desirable objective. Labor unions and labor laws that command an
association in order to form this desirable collectivity are teleological instruments.241 This
association allows those of us who are captivated by progressive ideals to foster, presumably, a
form of brotherhood and community that has been missing in our lives. Brotherhood, as
identified herein, may also be required to comply with the necessities of deontic logic requiring
obligation – mutual obligation. Labor movement advocates see unions as communal institutions
that must thrive in order to create a society imbued with the value of industrial and social
democracy, equality, social and economic justice, fair wages and working conditions, and
industrial and social peace.242 Workers give up their individuality for a compelled exchange
wherein dues payments and freedom of association are traded for speculative utilitarian and
emotional benefits resulting from a socially transformed community led by autocrats. The
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breathtaking weakness of this argument— mandating communal representation—may verify the
seductive attractiveness of self-congratulations as a substitute for clear-eyed policy243, or promote
skepticism.
Skepticism suggests there is little evidence that workers are despondent about their
current lack of representation.244 This perspective functions in concert with the lack of evidence
that compulsory union regimes conduce to consequentialist objectives such as “fair wages”245 and
“industrial peace.”246 American experience provides few reasons for workers to obligate
themselves willingly to either union hierarchs or the principles of exclusive representation and
majority rule. Given worker unwillingness, it is unlikely that the civil associations desired by
progressives can be obtained without compulsion. Conversely, progressives attracted to an
imperative that requires them to achieve the “greatest good for the greatest number,” freed from
necessity of taking differences between persons seriously247 and animated by the belief that
appeals to utility must be tied to the permanent interest of man as a progressive being, have
become despondent in the face of the reluctance of workers to bind themselves to a labor union
collectivity. Progressives see the present-day state of the labor movement rightly as the
crystallizing apogee of their discontent.
In a free society that values individual liberty wherein worker interests are not uniform,
such discontent should be seen as illegitimate. Leef intimates that labor unions can be legitimated
only when they act as purely voluntary associations that require individual consent before the
obligations of membership attach.248 George Leef opts for a classical liberal approach to civil
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association which is bounded by contractarianism. While the liberal contractarian model is not
without justifiable criticism – particularly in view of presumptions that are derived from
speculative enlightenment premises – the assertion that the contractarian model is strong on
morals and theory, but weak on both pragmatism and the capacity to resist authoritarianism249,
requires the context. Free Choice for Workers provides context that demonstrates the
vulnerability of such claims – these asserted deficiencies, as an empirical and ethical matter, are
more accurately attributable to a society grounded in progressive principles and ideals. History
and Hayek have shown that adherence to the gospel of government enforced progress tends to
lead us down the road of compulsion and ultimately toward authoritarianism, if not
totalitarianism. This possibility exposes the majority of the population to suppression by the few.
Consistent with that intuition, David Bernstein shows: legislation benefiting labor unions
suppressed the economic status of African Americans while failing to contribute positively to the
wage earned by nonunion white workers.250 In fact no historical correlation between union
membership and overall wage growth exists,251 which signifies that compulsory unionism
privileges some individuals with disproportionate benefits at the expense of others. By contrast, a
society defined by liberal values requires that we take seriously differences between persons, and
agrees that human progress, if it exists at all, is largely individual, often gradual and not
necessarily permanent since a government grounded in principle cannot privilege one group in
the war of all against all. Properly understood, Free Choice for Workers exposes contemporary
unionism as a variety, and progressive ideals as a victim, of “the ‘fraternal conceit’: the fanciful
notion that community and social solidarity can be secured” by compulsory forms of “political
association.”252
Resisting this impulse within the confines of any liberal democracy will be difficult and
must acknowledge the possibility that any liberal-legalist order consisting of adversarial
individuals and groups will not be sustainable.253 Such a democracy runs the risk of aggravating
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precisely those points of tension which a vibrant political process should aim at alleviating.254
The demand for workplace compulsion and state-sponsored fraternity, illustrates an ultimate
danger: Democracy, if unchecked by a renewed emphasis on individual liberty “may bring about
the precise end – despotism – which it is designed to avoid.”255
III. Conclusion
America’s labor laws suggest a principled basis for asserting “America suffers from a great
many laws that should never have been passed—laws that are at odds with both the Constitution
and with our tradition of individual liberty.”256 It is likely that one cannot understand America
without understanding the importance of ideals such as liberty, freedom of association and
speech, no matter how frequently the nation has failed to live up to them.257 It is also true that
“the design of the American system shows an equally deep recognition of the limits of human
ideals and the need to balance power and minimize risks of abuse.”258 In its concern for abuse of
the individuals by the privileged, Leef’s book operates reliably with ongoing efforts in
Congress259, and private efforts sponsored by organizations like Center for Union Facts260 and the
Mackinac Center for Public Policy.261 These efforts aim to expose union corruption, unfair labor
practices, undemocratic leaders and questionable efforts to expand union power and influence
through the use of coercive transfers from unwilling or poorly informed workers.262 Suggestive of
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authors like Linda Chavez and Daniel Gray263, George Leef supplies an impressive case that
union leaders have betrayed the American worker, distorted the founding principles of the labor
movement, and the betrayed the American public in their pursuit of power.264
Far from operating as an anti-union document, Free Choice for Workers functions as a prounion manuscript grounded in the conclusion that unions operate as defensible institutions and
laudable associations, when they represent workers who join voluntarily. The book underscores
Charles Baird’s assessment that “forced bargaining is never justified.”265 Free Choice for
Workers not only verifies Baird's conclusion, it proves that compulsory unionism characterized
by compulsory dues, exclusive representation, and autocracy, ought to be a continuing source of
controversy. Finally, George Leef makes evident an enduring corollary: freedom is much too
valuable to be entrusted to politicians of either political party.
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